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If networking is the new world order,' antitrust law is a provocative example.
Antitrust law is part of a genre. The genre is economic law that is national in origin,
that has been adopted in scores of countries, and that addresses conduct that increasingly
transcends national borders. Within this genre, cooperation is needed to carry out tasks
that lie at the core of the law; commonality in rules, standards, and modes of analysis is
desirable to facilitate a linked world system and to soften system clashes; and rules of
priority and modes for respect are needed to intermediate differences. Moreover, nations
that have recently adopted the law, and especially developing countries, appreciate gui-
dance from more experienced jurisdictions, and the guidance itself is part of a feedback
loop that generates soft norms. Finally, the area of law has been resistant to becoming
international law. In this genre, networking fills a real need in a globalized world.
This article contains four parts. Part one explores the internationalization of markets
and the stalled attempt to achieve an international law of antitrust. Part two explores the
rise of the International Competition Network (ICN), which is a unique, virtual network
of competition law officials.2 Part three explores the functioning of the ICN, its benefits,
and its limitations. Part four contains an assessment and conclusions.
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1. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). Slaughter conceptualizes networking
across borders, and particularly networks of government officials, as a key feature of the new world order and
a phenomenon that is "underappreciated, undersupported, and underused to address the central problems of
global governance." Id. at 1.
2. The ICN differs from networks in other fields of law, which often are engaged in explicit rule-making
and standard-setting. See Slaughter, supra note 1; Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Pierre-Hugues
Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 113 (2009) (comparing the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the
International Competition Network).
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This article argues that the ICN provides an outstanding example of a vehicle for inter-
action and cross-fertilization among national authorities, producing some convergences of
law, procedures, and policy; increasing knowledge and understanding; and facilitating
mentoring and other collaborative relationships. It observes that, in spite of great efforts
of inclusiveness, the ICN agenda is principally set and the norms principally forged by the
developed world, although consensus when reached involves give-and-take on all sides.
The article explores whether the ICN, in spite of its founding concept of "no power," has
power deriving from the soft-norm formation that it generates. The article ends with an
assessment of the ICN as it is and might be. It concludes that the ICN has exceeded
expectations of effectiveness to accomplish its circumscribed mission and that it can be
credited with a high degree of legitimacy. By its nature, it is not sufficient (and not in-
tended) to accomplish tasks that could create more nearly seamless antitrust governance.
For the future, the ICN has surprisingly strong (virtual) roots, but it needs continued
leadership and new momentum, some of which can be supplied by mining the depths of
controversial issues that it has thus far chosen to avoid.3
H. Antitrust, the World, and the Stalled Possibility of a Global System
A. WHAT Is ANTITRUST LAW?
The ICN is a network that arose somewhat serendipitously to fill a void. It arose in the
absence of an international law of antitrust. To begin this description and assessment of
the ICN, antitrust itself needs an introduction in order to identify the seeds of national
divergences as well as the space for commonalities.
Antitrust is law designed for market-based economies to control creation and uses of
economic power and thus to help markets work for the benefit of the people (buyers,
sellers, and firms competing on the merits) rather than for the benefit of a privileged and
powerful few. The definition of antitrust law and the articulation of its goals change from
time to time and are sensitive to the context of each particular country, its state of devel-
opment, and its economic conditions. In the United States for some ninety years, begin-
ning in the Industrial Revolution, antitrust was conceptualized as law against power in the
marketplace. In the 1960s, this concept was broadened. Antitrust became synonymous
with marketplace pluralism and empowerment for the underdog. In the 1980s, in view of
lowered trade barriers and a new quest for competitiveness, U.S. antitrust was recon-
ceived. It became and is now a tool for efficiency, usually interpreted as a tool to prevent
consumer loss through creation or abuse of market power.
In Europe, competition law was defined at the outset of the European Economic Com-
munity in 1957 as a vehicle for three goals: market integration; control of abuses of eco-
nomic power, often state-granted power; and leveling the playing field for business actors
across the Member States of the Community. Especially since the mid-1990s, European
competition law has emphasized consumers and efficiency, while still conceiving of com-
petition law as a valuable tool to help carry out the agenda of Europe for innovation,
integration, and competitiveness.
3. For example, inclusive growth as an antitrust guide for developing countries, industrial policy as an
unshakeable reality for not only China and India but the whole world.
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In Asia, antitrust law was slower in development because business by consensus was the
norm, such as in Japan under the umbrella of administrative guidance. Industrial policy
and fairness to business were priorities. Eventually in Asia, as well as most of the rest of
the world, markets and competition became accepted as a norm. The embrace of markets
was especially palpable after the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 and in recognition of
the failures of Russian communism and other totalitarian regimes to deliver an acceptable
standard of living for the people. In many Asian countries and many other communities
that have adopted competition laws, equity and industrial policy objectives-fairness to
small and indigenous businesses and the creation of national champions-were built into
the law and remain goals. The national-policy mandate is clear on the face of the new
antitrust law of China. Even in the supposedly market-friendly West, industrial policy
and protectionism are not unknown, as is evident in the current financial crisis; but to the
U.S. and the EU competition authorities, protectionism is an unwelcome intrusion into
competition policy, while in Asian nations it may be an inseparable part.
Developing countries historically favored a restrictive-practices law, which was meant
to proscribe restraints, especially by multinational enterprises, that coerced, foreclosed, or
squeezed domestic competitors or restricted their export opportunities. Much of the re-
strictive business practices (RBP) law addressed concerns with the gapingly unequal distri-
bution of wealth and power. Eventually, most developing countries allowed
"reasonableness" defenses to charges of restraints of trade and demanded that their law be
friendly to consumers. Moreover, in the modern age of globalization wherein integration
into the global economy is seen as the best hope for economic growth and alleviation of
poverty, developing countries also desire a competition law likely to produce efficiencies
and competitiveness for their firms.
Within each of these divergent conceptions there lie more differences, albeit less dra-
matic ones. For example, in modern times, although U.S. antitrust law and European
competition law are by many measures congruent, they employ modes for reaching effi-
ciency and serving consumers that sometimes differ from one another. U.S. authorities
and courts are more likely to assume that the unfettered market will work to produce
efficiency; that efficiencies gained by even a monopoly firm will inure to the benefit of the
public; and that antitrust intervention tends to compromise efficiency and protect ineffi-
cient competitors, raising prices for consumers (except for cartels, which fix prices, divide
markets, or rig bids and are clearly inefficient).4 Therefore, non-cartel conduct must
reach a high threshold before it is labeled anticompetitive.
The European Commission and European courts are more likely to pursue the same
goal (an efficient system that serves its consumers) by protecting dynamic rivalry, market
access, and the competitive structure of the market. Moreover, European antitrust is
sometimes proactive and is used, along with other tools, to liberalize markets such as
telecommunications, whereas U.S. antitrust is defensive; the place of U.S. antitrust is to
prevent obstructive acts that harm consumers but not to create environments or duties that
might help them.
4. Eleanor Fox, The Efficieny Paradox, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVFRSHOT THE MARK: THE
EFFECr OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUSi 77, 79 (R. Pitofsky ed., Oxford
2008).
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Despite the differences of the now 100 antitrust regimes, however, the generic charac-
terization above works as a general description of antitrust.
B. WHY ANTITRUST NEEDS A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK
Antitrust needs a global framework, both because markets are global and because na-
tions are strategic-s Conduct launched in one nation can harm people around the world.
Without a framework that rises above national boundaries, vision is impaired and coher-
ence is lacking. Full costs and benefits of transactions are obscured. Firms in one nation
may squeeze out competitors and harm consumers in another. Culprits may escape detec-
tion and punishment.
A piece of this problem-negative externalities-can in theory be handled by norms of
extraterritorial jurisdiction embodied in the effects doctrine, by which victim nations can
call foreigners to account. But often the victim nation does not have the resources or
power to catch the offshore perpetrators. It may not even be able to obtain personal
jurisdiction over them. Recourse is often more theoretical than real. These difficulties
are experienced especially by developing countries, which almost by definition do not have
the resources to catch and deter violations that originate beyond their borders. 6 There-
fore, ironically, in the case of a detected cartel that harms the whole world, victims in
developed countries may be well compensated, while developing country victims of the
same conduct, who may need recompense much more, are left to suffer their wounds.
Second, for businesses (and therefore their customers), maneuvering a balkanized anti-
trust terrain is costly. A business firm may be forced to deal with twenty or fifty or more
jurisdictions, all with different laws, to accomplish one transaction or to implement one
business strategy. Being subject to the laws of 100 jurisdictions is disruptive and expen-
sive. The costs are even greater when some nations' laws condemn what others allow, and
especially if host laws handicap cost-saving or innovative conduct or impose divergent
remedies. 7 Therefore, one hears the business plea in developed country fora: adopt our
law. Converge to us.
Third, by national level law alone, we cannot achieve global coherence. Neither can we
appreciate the full costs and benefits of a multinational merger, nor devise and enforce
optimal and congruent penalties for world cartels or monopolistic conduct. Nor can we
assure adequate compensation for antitrust victims or appropriately constrain state-au-
thored restraints that privilege private or nationalistic interests.
C. THE AGENDA FOR WORLD ANrITRUST LAW AND WHY IT HAS FAILED
In modern times, the Europeans were the first to articulate and promote a world anti-
trust agenda. 8 Europe has spent half a century studying and implementing modes of es-
5. See Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrut and the Doba Dome, 43 VA. J. I.r'L L. 911 (2003).
6. See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1781 (2000).
7. See A. Neil Campbell & J. William Rowley, The Internationalization of Unilateral Conduct Laws-Conflict,
Comity, Cooperation and/or Convergence?, 75 ANITRusr L. J. 267 (2008).
8. For a useful account of the development of international competition policy as launched by the Euro-
pean Commission, see also Alberto Heimler, Conpetition Policy as a Tool of EU Foreign Policy: Multilateralism,
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tablishing community among nations, having in mind the benefits of community-wide
vision while being mindful of the realm preserved to the non-parochial sovereignty inter-
ests of each Member State. It is not surprising, therefore, that the European Community
was the first jurisdiction to study the need for global vision in competition policy and to
make recommendations to achieve it.
A "Committee of Wise Men" convened, opined, and sketched a model of a competition
law for the world, which they placed institutionally within the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Under this proposal, designed for transactions or conduct with cross-border ef-
fects, the project for a world antitrust framework would begin slowly and from the ground
up. It would start with building blocks of cooperation among nations' antitrust authori-
ties, principles of transparency, non-discrimination and due process, and a program for
capacity building and technical assistance to developing countries. It would multilateralize
existing bilateral cooperation agreements. The system would advance to the adoption of
common substantive principles against abuse of dominance and cartels, eventually encom-
passing the substantive law common to antitrust systems, and would put into place a pro-
cess for dispute resolution within the WTO framework. 9
The proposal was vetted within the Competition Directorate of the European Commis-
sion and then within the European Commission and European Council. It was aired and
refined and became the basis for the Singapore antitrust initiative adopted by the WTO in
December 1996, which established the V/TO Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade and Competition Policy.1° The Working Group, which met many times over the
course of seven years, became a vehicle for discussions and submissions from scores of
nations, developed and developing, on the benefits and drawbacks of a world competition-
policy initiative, as well as submissions on the various discrete subjects of antitrust." Re-
actions of jurisdictions to an antitrust competence in the WTO differed widely. The
United States expressed strong skepticism toward a world initiative for fear that develop-
ing and other countries' protectionist goals would be enshrined, that consensus principles
would be reduced to the lowest common denominator, that disputes would be resolved by
uninformed bureaucrats), and that independent agencies would lose their prerogative of
Bilateralism and Soft Convergence, in THE EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY: MYTH OR REALITY? (F.
Bindi ed., Brookings 2009).
9. Commission of the European Communities, Report of the Group of Experts, Competition Policy in the new Trade
Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules, COM (1995) 359 final (Dec. 7, 1995) [hereinafter
Van Miert Report]. See European Commission, XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, at 95, COM (1997) 628
final (1996), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/annual-reports/rap96 en.html.
10. See European Commission, XX Ttb Report on Competition Policy, supra note 9, at 95.
11. See World Trade Organization, Annual Report 1997. Trade and Competition Policy, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, 29-91
[hereinafter WTO 1997 Report]. For more information, see also the annual reports of the working group and
the underlying documents, available at http://ww.wto.org/englisb/tratop-e/comp-e/wgtcp-docs-e.htm. For the
history and early evolution of the VTO initiative, see Clifford A. Jones, Come the Millennium (Round)? Com-
peting Visions of International Antitrust Policy in the European Union and the United States, in INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: 2001 FORDHAIM CORPORATE LAW ch. 3 (Barry Hawk ed., 2001). For reflec-
tions on the work of the VTO Working Group, see Robert D. Anderson & Fr~d6ric Jenny, Competition
Policy, Economic Development and the Possible Role of a Multilateral Framework on Competition Poliy: Insights from
the WTO Working Group on Trade and Competition Policy, in COMPETION POLICY IN EAsT ASIA (E. Medalla
ed., 2005).
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prosecutorial discretion.12 Europe, Japan, Korea, and Canada favored a WTO framework
for antitrust as the natural next step. Hong Kong would support only a regime against
state restraints of trade, while India and various developing countries stood against a world
antitrust initiative for fear that resulting rules would favor the West and further colonize
and marginalize developing countries. Developing countries feared also that they lacked
the technical knowledge and sophistication to protect their interests in the course of nego-
tiations and that they lacked the resources and other capacities to establish and carry on
the work of a competing agency. 13
Despite the doubts, the idea of a competition initiative within the WTO gained traction
and held its grip for some years. Reactively, the United States introduced a different idea.
U.S. officials proposed a recommendation against cartels in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Development and Cooperation (OECD). The OECD is an organization of devel-
oped nations with no dispute resolution powers. While the Europeans had prioritized
abuse of dominance, and vertical restraints at national boundaries, as the most heinous of
antitrust offenses, Americans prioritized cartels. Americans regarded single firm (non-
conspiratorial) acts and vertical restraints as usually efficient and good. They wanted to
shift focus away from abuse of dominance and vertical restraints. 14
They were not pleased with the WTO as an antitrust forum, for the WTO caters to the
trade community. Results are negotiated among more than 140 (now 155) nations, in-
cluding many developing countries, many of which were seen to prefer protection to com-
petition. The virtues of a recommendation against cartels in the OECD were three-fold:
it would prioritize hard core cartels (price fixing and market division among competitors);
it would mute the stress on abuse of dominance and vertical restraints; and it would move
the forum from the WTO to one comprised of more nearly like-minded countries and
one without enforcement powers. At the OECD, no nation would risk being disciplined
by a remote world organization and by decision-makers who might dislike multinationals,
lack understanding of economics, and distrust free markets. 15
The two initiatives-the focused one in the OECD and the broad one in the WTO-
proceeded side by side. The OECD nations adopted the Hard Core Cartel Recommen-
dation. 16 The Hard Core Cartel Recommendation urges that nations adopt and maintain
an anti-cartel law. It does not forbid derogations from the anti-cartel principle, but it
urges that nations limit and review their derogations. The signatory nations undertake to
report new derogations to the OECD.
12. See Joel Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth
Century, in IN'TERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: FORDHIAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE ch. 1
(Barry Hawk ed., 1998).
13. See World Trade Organization [WTO], Documents of the Working Group on the Interaction Between
Trade and Competition Policy, Countries' Submission, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/comp-e/
wgtcp-docs-e.hm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
14. Vertical restraints are restraints in the course of distributing a product, such as exclusive dealing and
exclusive directories.
15. See Daniel Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 478 (2000)
(recommending that the OECD, not the WTO, be the forum for antitrust convergence).
16. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, C(98)35/Final (Mar. 25, 1998), available at htp://
strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/1998oecd hccrec.pdf.
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Meanwhile, in the face of U.S. criticism of its WTO initiative, the European Commis-
sion streamlined its proposal, limiting the substantive undertaking of states to adopting
and maintaining an anti-cartel law,' 7 and all but eliminating dispute resolution. Dispute
resolution would be available only for certain objective defaults such as failing to maintain
an anti-cartel law. Left unmodified were the recommendations that nations cooperate in
matters of common interest, ensure transparency and procedural fairness in application of
their competition laws, and support capacity building and technical assistance for develop-
ing countries. This slimmed-down proposal became a part of the provisional agenda of
the round of the WTO introduced at the ministerial meeting at Doha, Qatar, in 2001-a
round dubbed the Doha Development Round in recognition of the fact that the developed
countries had been the big winners of the recent trade rounds, and the developing nations
had not received a fair share of the gains. The Doha Agenda was meant to focus on
measures that would especially help developing countries, perhaps ironically.
At the ministerial meeting in Cancun in fall 2003, however, Europe and the United
States came forward with insufficient offers to reduce agricultural tariffs and subsidies, and
the whole round faltered.' 8 The negotiators considered it necessary to jettison the more
tangential aspirations, and the antitrust agenda was sacrificed to the hoped-for success of
the round, which has now substantially failed.' 9
At present, there is no active agenda for world antitrust law, and the enterprise is not
likely to be revived in the near future. While ongoing research, roundtables, and peer
review activity continue in the OECD and United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), much attention has shifted to the ICN. The work of these
older organizations is important, and they continue to make significant contributions to
the progress and coherence of antitrust in a globalized world, sometimes in collaboration
with one another and with the ICN. The focus of this article on the ICN is not meant to
minimize their continuing contributions.
IH. The Rise of the Network
A. THE BrTH OF THE ICN
By the late 1990s, in the wake of the successfully completed Uruguay Trade Round,
heightened global business activity exposed the need for deeper transnational coordination
in vetting mergers and rooting out cartels. In 1997, President Clinton's Attorney General
17. This change effected a sharp shift of focus from vertical restraints and abuses by dominant firms to
cartels. See THE SINGAPORE ISSU.S AND THE WORLD TRADING SysrEM: THE ROAD TO CANCUN AND
BEYOND (State Secretariat of Economic Affairs & Simon Evenett, eds., WTI 2003); Heimler, supra note 8.
The shift was a U.S. victory
18. See Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Charlton, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: How TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVEL-
OPMENT 1-6 (2005).
19. In the wake of the Cancun Ministerial Meeting, the European Commission issued a Communication
considering how the EU could contribute to a revival of negotiations on competition and the other Singapore
issues (investment, trade facilitation, and government procurement). As to the development dimension of the
Doha Development Agenda, it said: "The integration of developing countries into the world economy is a
necessary condition for development. Such integration will be deeper and fairer if anchored in the multilat-
eral trading system." Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament,
and to the Economic and Social Committee, at 15, 26 Nov. 2003.
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Janet Reno convened the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC)
to the U.S. Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust to study the
implications of globalization on antitrust cooperation and enforcement. The Committee
was co-chaired by James Rill, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, and Paula
Stern, former Chair of the International Trade Commission. Its executive director was
Professor Merit Janow of Columbia University. The Committee was comprised of ten
other members, including seven business or foundation executives and three professors
(including the author) of law, business, and economics. At the time, the debate about a
competition initiative in the VTO was active and gaining traction, and the U.S. Assistant
Attorney General in charge of Antitrust, Joel Klein, had expressed strong opposition.
20
The Committee held hearings, received submissions, and deliberated. In 2000, it issued
a report containing numerous recommendations for increased coordination and coopera-
tion and modes for convergence of law and process, in particular regarding multinational
mergers and world cartels. It recommended also a Global Competition Initiative (GCI).21
The GCI was envisioned as a virtual, voluntary forum with no ground address or secreta-
riat, no power to make binding rules, and no power of adjudication. The idea for the
enterprise stemmed from the realization that antitrust authorities, business people, and
experts lacked a forum for the sharing of views and experiences, for close cooperation, and
for exploration of common issues that could lead to convergence or harmonization. Al-
though competition problems were increasingly global, these issues had no logical anti-
trust home.
No existing organization filled the need. 22 The OECD was and is an organization of
developed nations and is therefore-despite its outreach efforts-exclusive or limited.
The UNCTAD caters to developing countries and was not satisfactory to developed
countries. The VTO is a trade organization at which trade representatives have the seat
at the table. Moreover, success at the V/TO entails bargaining and trade-offs, in contrast
to (what some antitrust officials saw as) the "purer" antitrust rule-of-law. Antitrust au-
thorities lacked a table of their own. Further, in the V/TO the mere prospect of commit-
ting their nations seemed to make the representatives reluctant to talk freely about
solutions to common problems.
The GCI would by-pass the limits of each of these organizations. It would be a roots-
up forum. It would include developing as well as developed countries. It would be purely
voluntary, with no binding action. The logic of GCI, said the ICPAC Report, "stems in
part from a recognition that countries may be prepared to cooperate in meaningful ways
but are not necessarily prepared to be legally bound under international law."
23
The ICPAC submitted its report to Attorney General Reno and Assistant Attorney
General Klein in February 2000. In September 2000, at the Tenth Anniversary Confer-
ence for European Merger Control, Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein made a propo-
sal to the international group present:
20. See Klein, supra note 12.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, ANTITRUST Div., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ArrORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTI-
TRUST 281-85 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/chapter6.htm [hereinafter ICPAC Report].
22. See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round, 2 J. IN-'m ECON. L. 665, 677 (1999)
(proposing a World Competition Forum).
23. ICPAC Report, supra note 21, at 284.
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[]e all realize that bilateral efforts, while absolutely essential, are not a complete
answer.... There is still a lot of work to be done without an obvious unifying forum
in which to do it. Our Advisory Committee recognized the problem and called for a
Global Competition Initiative. I have been giving this considerable thought and be-
lieve that, whatever happens on antitrust at the WTO . . . we should move in the
direction of a Global Competition Initiative, cautiously and on an exploratory basis,
but in the end I think such a development is almost inevitable. 24
Klein's proposal came as a surprise to his counterparts, for until this moment unilateral-
ism had held sway. European Competition Commissioner Mario Monti almost immedi-
ately welcomed the idea as a positive move towards multilateralism. But Klein's proposal
was met with skepticism. Why yet another forum? Would the GCI only tread on the toes
of the OECD, the UNCTAD, and to some extent the World Bank? Was the CCI an
empty vessel, a "headless horseman," only meant to take the wind out of antitrust sails in
the WVTO?25
Gradually, however, the idea of a virtual global antitrust initiative gained acceptance. In
February 2001, the International Bar Association, with support from the American Bar
Association Antitrust Law Section and the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, convened a
meeting at Ditchley Park near London, under the leadership of William Rowley. The
meeting resulted in support for an international competition initiative, which was to be
useful to "multiple audiences: government, business, legal and other communities," 26 in-
clusive of developing as well as developed jurisdictions, and a forum in which participants
could speak in their individual capacities. Rationalizing the merger process was to be high
on the agenda. Indeed, rationalizing the burdensome, uncoordinated premerger filing
processes of scores of jurisdictions seemed to be business lawyers' motivating passion for
their support. The bar associations offered resources and analytical support and offered to
host an initial meeting to consider how to proceed. 27 This offer was not accepted by the
antitrust authorities, who envisioned government agency control, but the Ditchley meet-
ing and the support it engendered was to be a crucial factor in the eventual launch of the
ICN.
The increasing but still tentative enthusiasm for the global forum coincided with the
change in presidential administrations in the United States, from Bill Clinton to George
W. Bush. U.S. support was crucial to the project. But "in early 2001 it was ... not yet
clear how the incoming U.S. [Bush] administration would view the proposed initiative." 28
24. See Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, Address at the EC Merger
Control 10th Anniversary Conference: Time for a Global Competition Initiative? (Sept. 14, 2000), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/6486.pdf. See also Merit Janow, Observations on Two Multilateral
Venues: The International Competition Network (ICN) and the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ANrITRUST LAW &
POLICY: 2002 FORD-IAM CORPORATE LAW INS1TFrruE 49 (Barry Hawk ed., 2003); Jones, supra note 11.
25. See Lawson Hunter & Susan Hutton, Global Competition Initiative: A "Headless Horseman?," in INTER-
NATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: 2000 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW LST1TUTE ch. 3 (Barry Hawk
ed., 2001); U.S. and Canadian Antitrust (Panel Discussion), in 1N1'ERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY:
2000 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INsTrTuTE 45-59 (Barry Hawk ed., 2001).
26. Janow, supra note 24, at. 51.
27. Id. at 52-53.
28. Id. at 53.
SPRING 2009
160 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Charles James was confirmed by the Senate as Assistant Attorney General in Charge of
Antitrust in June 2001. He consulted with Timothy Muris, newly appointed Chairman of
the Federal Trade Commission, and both gave their support to the project. James was
especially attracted to the idea that the initiative would be "all antitrust, all of the time" 9
(i.e., not trade), and that the initiative would focus on practical tasks where solutions were
achievable (i.e., ICN was not to be or to auger a lofty antitrust code for the world). The
collaborators in the new initiative would pick the "low-hanging fruit" that touched no raw
nerves. For example, they would seek consensus as to the earliest date on which jurisdic-
tions would receive pre-merger notifications, thus eliminating the inefficiencies of multi-
ple uncoordinated filing requirements and waiting periods for multinational mergers.
By fall 2001, sufficient consensus had been achieved, and at the annual Fordham Inter-
national Antitrust Conference, representatives of fourteen jurisdictions 30 came on stage
and announced the launching of the initiative. As for the name of the enterprise, the word
"global" was dropped. In the wake of the rioting at the G-8 summit in Genoa, "global"
was feared to be a red flag to anti-globalization activists. "International" was a less-
charged descriptor. "Network" added an interactive, non-hierarchical flavor. Thus: In-
ternational Competition Network.
By the time of the announcement of the launching at Fordham, some contours of the
enterprise were clear, and others soon became clear. The members of the ICN were to be
the government antitrust (competition law) authorities. Representatives of international
organizations such as the OECD, the UNCTAD and the World Bank were to be invited
to participate in the work and meetings (but not the voting) as non-governmental advisors
(NGAs). NGAs were to be drawn, also, from the legal, business, academic, and consumer
communities. The latter would be designated by the antitrust authorities of their nation.
There would be a steering group, with a chair and vice, who would facilitate activities
including the annual conference and telephone conference calls on issues and procedures,
and who would manage a web site. The work was to be project-based. Working groups
would do research, draft memos, formulate proposed best practices, guidelines and recom-
mendations for consideration at the annual meetings, and engage in other projects such as
(as it developed) informal technical assistance. The ICN would facilitate the sharing of
information and experience, facilitate cooperation, and work towards consensus rules,
principles, methodologies, and procedures.
Thus, the ICN was born. As events took their course in Cancun, 31 the WNTO initiative
dissolved into the background, and the ICN emerged center stage.
B. THE FUNCTIONING AND EVOLUTION OF THE ICN
One of the first tasks of the ICN steering group was to launch a work plan. Projects
were to be prepared for the first annual meeting, which, it was decided, would be held in
Naples in September 2002. To qualify, the subject matter of the project was to be of
29. See Charles James, Reconciling Divergent Enforcement Policies: Where Do We Go From Here?, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLIcy: 2001 FoRDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTrrUTE 1, 5 (Barry Hawk ed.,
2002).
30. Australia, Canada, European Union, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Af-
rica, United Kingdom, United States, and Zambia.
31. See Stiglitz & Charlton, supra note 18.
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broad general interest and likely to engage a large portion of the membership, and the
project was to be capable of achieving practical outcomes that would make a difference. A
project on merger process was inevitable.
The project work would be carried out by working groups. Each working group would
be guided by a chair or by co-chairs, often pairing (as it later developed) a developed and a
less developed nation. All interested members of the ICN and the NGAs would be invited
to participate in the work of the working groups.
In the initial stages of the ICN, working groups were formed: on multijurisdictional
mergers and advocacy. The project of the Advocacy Working Group was designed to
highlight the important but daunting work competition authorities can do within their
own governments: supporting pro-market policies where the market can work, advocating
against unnecessary regulation and statism, and helping to develop a culture of
competition.
The working group devised and distributed questionnaires to all members, synthesized
the answers, and wrote a report, which was distributed at the first annual conference in
Naples and posted on the ICN's website. The report addressed the role of advocacy, the
fruits of advocacy in terms of tangible benefits for consumers and respect for the competi-
tion authority, political influences on advocacy, and the importance of institutional set-
tings in either facilitating or obstructing the authority's advocacy efforts. This work has
been, reportedly, of significant aid to competition authorities.
The Merger Working Group was divided into three subgroups: notification and proce-
dures, the analytical framework of merger review, and investigation techniques in merger
review. In the first year, the investigative techniques subgroup planned and soon thereaf-
ter held a workshop. The analytical framework subgroup sent questionnaires to all mem-
bers, with a view to comparing the substantive tests for merger prohibition of each
jurisdiction. The subgroup compiled the information for each jurisdiction and wrote a
discussion paper on the objectives of analytical frameworks. This subgroup was later to
compile an extremely helpful handbook consolidating the analytical methodologies of all
responding jurisdictions, with case examples.
The subgroup on notifications and procedures was charged with the subject at the core
of the defense bar's support for ICN. Leading members of the bar had been decrying
chaos in merger control.32 At the time, approximately sixty-five nations required merger
review, and the jurisdictions had different timing, different informational requirements,
arbitrary filing deadlines, and often a long-arm reach to mergers with little relationship
with the regulating jurisdiction.
The subgroup included leading merger lawyers from the private sector, who were active
and indeed essential participants and became the reliable backbone of the work. The
subgroup studied merger notification requirements in all member jurisdictions. It delib-
erated on practical possibilities for coherence. For the first annual meeting, it proposed
that the ICN members adopt eight guiding principles to make the process more transpar-
ent, fair, and efficient, and it proposed three recommended practices to address needs for
32. See Global Forum for Competition and Trade Policy, Special Report, Policy Directions for Global Merger
Review (1999) (organized byJ. William Rowley, then Chairman of the International Bar Association's Section
on Business Law and Director of the Global Forum on Competition and Trade Policy) [hereinafter Global
Competition Review 1999].
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clarity, efficiency, and limits on excessive jurisdiction. It organized a "weblinks" project
that posted links to the merger laws and guidelines of all members; it prepared a report on
the costs and burdens of merger notification and review; and it later published a report on
confidentiality waivers with a model form and a survey and report on merger filing fees.
Also, the subgroup devised and facilitated a common template for the presentation of
information about merger review procedures from the various jurisdictions. The group
requested the member authorities to fill out the template with their own information for
posting on the ICN website. More than fifty jurisdictions have now posted their informa-
tion in template form, which is a form very friendly to practitioners and other users.33
The eight guiding principles proposed were: recognition of each jurisdiction's sover-
eignty; transparency; non-discrimination on the basis of nationality; procedural fairness;
efficient, timely and effective review; coordination among agencies reviewing the same
transaction; convergence of processes to agreed best practices; and protection of confiden-
tial information. The three recommended practices were: an appropriate nexus with the
reviewing jurisdiction; clear and understandable notification thresholds based on objec-
tively quantifiable criteria such as sales and assets (not market share); and a recommenda-
tion on the timing of merger notifications. The latter has two aspects: flexibility as to the
earliest date of notification so as to permit parties to coordinate multijurisdictional filings,
and elimination of filing deadlines.
The guiding principles were adopted, after discussion, at the first annual conference.
The recommended practices were discussed, and later amended and adopted, along with
others, at the second annual conference.
Thereafter, more working groups were formed. A Working Group on Competition
Policy Implementation studied technical assistance by more mature to younger agencies
and wrote a detailed report on what types and character of technical assistance tends to
work and what does not work. The same working group devised and implemented an
informal program of technical assistance. Under one model, the consultation model,
more mature agencies were invited to offer assistance (usually answering questions and
having dialogues by telephone) in whatever area of competition law and they chose, and
younger agencies were invited to make inquiries of designated persons. Under the second
form, the partnership model, more mature and younger agencies were paired, and they
developed a mentoring/mentored relationship for the give-and- take in answering inquir-
ies and addressing problems.
A Cartel Working Group was formed. Its members are currently preparing a manual
on Anti-Cartel Enforcement Techniques. The working group has thus far posted three
chapters on the website. It produced an anti-cartel enforcement template, available on the
website, providing a common format for organizing the information of rules and proce-
dures of the various jurisdictions' anti-cartel enforcement regimes. It assists host nations
in organizing cartel workshops in many places in the world, attempting to make the train-
ing geographically available.
Also formed was a Working Group on Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors.
This group studied the role of antitrust in banking and produced a report on the appropri-
ate interaction between competition and regulations in the banking sector. It developed
33. See International Competition Network RCN], Merger Working Group 2008-2009 Work Plan, available
at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/ibrary/mergers/Merger-WG-3.pdf.
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ten best practices, such as an open competitive environment without unnecessary restric-
tions. A Working Group on Telecommunications Services produced best practices of a
similar sort on the respective roles for antitrust and regulation in the telecommunications
sector.
In the earliest years of the ICN, the projects undertaken were chosen in part for their
essentially noncontroversial and practical nature in line with the formulation expressed by
Charles James and echoed by the steering group's first chair, Konrad von Finckenstein of
Canada, that the ICN would be devoted to getting practical tasks done. It became appar-
ent, however, that some of the major issues of coherence were not about the nuts and bolts
of practice.
A proposal was made to study legal standards for abuse of dominance, with a view to-
wards proposing recommended practices. Abuse of dominance was potentially a "light-
ning rod" subject. In the United States, the scope of the law (the prohibition against
monopolization) had been increasingly narrowed. 34 Indeed, many American jurists and
policy-makers had expressed the view that almost all strategies of dominant firms, acting
alone and not with competitors, are pro-competitive and help consumers, and that most
antitrust challenges to dominant firm conduct merely protect competitors from efficient
conduct. 35 Many jurisdictions, and probably most developing countries, have a different
perspective. In their experience, abusive use of power by dominant firms is a principal
obstacle to achieving a competitive market. After discussion and debate, the steering
group authorized the study of abuse of dominance.
Accordingly, a Working Group on Unilateral Conduct 36 was formed. It is co-chaired
by the German Bundeskartellamt and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. An unprece-
dented number of members signed up to participate in the Working Group on Unilateral
Conduct, and a very large number of NGAs joined the group as well. The initial subjects
studied were: what are the objectives of unilateral conduct rules?, and what is substantial
market power, 37 and how is it proved? Questionnaires were formulated and distributed,
answered by scores of members and NGAs, and analyzed. Memoranda were drafted, sum-
marizing and describing the result and were vetted in telephone conference calls with
contributions from participants around the world, and by email. The working group co-
chairs and other interested participants then drafted recommended practices, which again
were vetted by participants around the world. The work product was submitted to the
steering group and eventually submitted to the membership, debated, and adopted.
The Working Group on Unilateral Conduct is also addressing specific practices that
may be anticompetitive. It studied or is studying exclusive dealing, tying and bundling,
discounts and rebates, and predatory pricing. It designs and distributes questionnaires to
the members to obtain information about their rules and methodologies. It is in the pro-
cess of assimilating answers regarding certain practices. In doing so, the co-chairs pay
particular attention to what the various authorities mean when they use words such as
34. E.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMtPETrrION AND MONOPOLY: REPORT ON SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECT-ION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/
236681.pdf.
36. Essentially, this means the law of abuse of dominance and its U.S. counterpart, monopolization.
37. This would include dominant firm or monopoly power.
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"anticompetitive," "effect," "foreclosure," and "intent" in order to understand diver-
gences-often concealed by a superficially common language.
The above description gives a sense of the work of the working groups. There is much
more.
In addition to the work of the working groups, the ICN (as noted) sponsors workshops
on merger and cartel analysis, detection, and enforcement. Most recently, it held a work-
shop on unilateral conduct, which focused on implementation of the recommended prac-
tices thus far adopted and analytical techniques for identifying significant market power
and abuses.
The annual conferences are the culminating event of each year's work and a focal point
for completing promised work product. They provide a platform for the recommenda-
tions of the working groups, and other proposals, which are presented, debated, and nor-
mally adopted. The programming is designed to be inclusive of a large range of
participants, including individuals from developing countries. For the first years, the an-
nual conference programmers shied away from controversial issues. At the last annual
conference (Kyoto 2008), however, there was at last lively debate. Issues of unilateral
market power and abuse of superior bargaining position were addressed. All annual con-
ferences feature a number of break-out sessions, at which participants explore issues more
deeply and personally in small discussion groups.
After recommended practices are adopted, the working group that originated them nor-
mally gives guidance on how to implement them.38 It may hold workshops to do so. For
the recommended practices on merger process in particular, the ICN keeps track of their
implementation, including which members change their legislation or rules to bring their
systems into conformity. At least thirty-five ICN members, which is approximately half of
all members with a merger notification system, have amended their laws, regulations, or
procedures, bringing them into closer conformity with the ICN recommendations.39
Do members have any (soft) obligations to adopt the ICN recommended practices? On
this point there is some difference of opinion or nuance. Konrad von Finkelstein, while
chair of the Steering Group, said:
[Tihe ICN is aspirational in nature. It makes best practice proposals. These prac-
tices are the product of the best minds in both the private and public sectors. While
there is no obligation to adopt any of the best practices endorsed by the ICN, imple-
mentation will result from the persuasiveness of our work products, peer pressure
among Members and the advocacy and support of NGAs.40
38. See ICN, Implementation Handbook, Examples of Legislative Text, Rules, and Practices that Conform to Se-
lected ICN Guiding Principles and Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures (April
2006), available at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive06l /conforminglangdraft
handbkfinal.pdf, Fifth Annual ICN Conference, Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006). See also Randy Tritell,
U.S. Federal Commission, Presentation, Panel 11: Notification and Procedures, Third Annual ICN Confer-
ence, Seoul, Korea (April 2004), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/
conference_3rd seoul-2004/notiproctritell.pdf.
39. E-mail from Randy Tritell, Director, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Federal Trade Commission,
to Eleanor Fox (Dec. 12, 2008) (on file with author).
40. Konrad von Finckenstein, International Antitrust Policy and the International Competition Network, in IN-
TERNATIONAL AN-rRusT LAW & POLIcy: 2002 FORDHA CoRPoRATE LAW INSTr=uTE 38 (Barry Hawk
ed., 2003).
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William Rowley has suggested that ICN's success is directly related to implementation
of the merger recommendations. He has expressed concern that "the implementation
effort to date has not found sufficient traction to make a material difference with many of
those agencies or regimes where implementation is most needed."41 The ICN Steering
Group issued a news release at the close of the 2008 Kyoto meeting entitled "Competition
authorities from around the world send clear message on convergence"-implying that
greater conformity of the ICN members with the ICN recommendations is a measure of
the ICN's success. 42
IV. Assessment: Effectiveness, Legitimacy, Sufficiency
In this section we ask: is the ICN effective? Is it legitimate? Is it sufficient? Then we
turn to a question that has bearing on all three inquiries: does the iCN have power or
influence, and if so, what are the implications?
A. EFFEcTIvENEss: Is THE ICN EFFECTrVE?
To assess effectiveness, we revert to the ICN's ambitions. The ICN's stated ambitions
are modest. It aspires to provide "competition authorities with a specialized yet informal
venue for maintaining regular contacts and addressing practical competition concerns," 43
with a view also to facilitating consensus on issues of law and procedure, thereby bringing
antitrust enforcement practices, techniques, and interpretations into greater alignment.
The ICN also works to facilitate mentoring of newer and less experienced antitrust
authorities.
The ICN was designed to be informal, to have no ground location, and to make no
binding rules. The ICN was meant to have no power. The ICN was designed not to be
antitrust governance.
Recall that the question at the outset was not whether the ICN would fulfill tasks of
governance but whether it would do anything at all; whether it would be a "headless
horseman;" 44 whether it would be redundant; whether it could and would have any mo-
mentum given its humble virtual aspirations; and whether, even if it got traction, it would
quickly wither away.
Judged by its own aspirations and against a chorus of skeptics, the ICN has been an
enormous success. It appears to be stable and (virtually) rooted. It has leadership and
41. See William Rowley & Omar Wakil, The ICN Five Years On, GLOBAL COMPErrON RFvIEW May
2007, at 29, available at http://www.mcmillan.ca/Upload/Publication/WRowley-OWakil-TheICN five_
years-on.pdf. The authors decry the fact that "the merger review provisions of a considerable number of
ICN member regimes do not conform with, or even fall below, the ICN's recommended practices." They list
non-conforming jurisdictions and their thresholds. Id. at 30-31. See also Ron Stern, General Electric, ICN
Implementation Panel: Implementation Is the Goal of the ICN, Fourth Annual ICN Conference, Bonn,
Germany, June 2005, available at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/library/con-
ference/4.
42. ICN, Newsroom 2008, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/newsroom/
2008 (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
43. ICN, About the ICN, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/about-icn (last
visited Mar. 18, 2009).
44. See Hunter & Hutton, supra note 25.
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momentum. It is a unique connector of people around the world committed to a common
task. It inspires hard work and devotion. It provides information, perspective, and con-
tacts. It provides guidance and moral support to newer and more vulnerable agencies
pursuing the lonely and often resisted task within their nation of creating a competition
culture. It provides a blueprint or referent for agencies in drafting or revising their rules
or regulations.45 And it gives anchor to the officials of the newer agencies appearing
before legislators and jurists. "This is the way it is done in the world" or "This is the
international standard of good practice" is powerful testimony.
The ICN has created a unique work product. Its leaders and cadre of volunteer workers
are continually adding to the work product, virtually all of which is posted on the website.
The templates for merger analysis and cartel enforcement convey important information
about each jurisdiction in a common form, and the merger guidelines handbook of princi-
ples, analysis, and methodologies is both an informative comparative document and a gui-
dance document. The competition advocacy toolkit and the cartel handbook, including
methods of detection and enforcement, are deeply informational and useful sources for
knowledge and skills. The various authorities' answers to questionnaires, for example, on
the objectives of their law and on their framework for analyzing unilateral practices, are all
posted on the website and form a unique trove of information for research and under-
standing of comparative antitrust law. The guiding principles and recommended practices
in merger review are a particular achievement. Nations' implementation of the recom-
mended practices and use of the guiding principles have rationalized the global merger
process, reducing costs, eliminating conflicts, and facilitating transactions. The annual
workshops on cartels and periodic workshops on mergers and, more recently, unilateral
practices, educate and facilitate convergence. Close professional relationships are forged
in the working groups, in the course of the informal mentoring and technical assistance,
and at the annual meetings. These networks of relationships deepen understanding, re-
spect, and trust; build community; and provide ready-made avenues for mutual assistance
and cooperation.
It appears to this observer that, as a result of the ICN, merger process in the world has
improved; cartel enforcement in the world has improved; and the mutual understanding of
laws, policies, and cultures among the myriad participants has reached a new level.
One may also assess the effectiveness of the ICN in relation to other organizations.
Recall that skeptics argued that existing organizations were already performing or could
easily perform the tasks targeted by the ICN. From the vantage of eight years later, what
are the merits of this claim of redundancy? The answer to the question is clear. The ICN
is doing work that neither the OECD, nor the UNCTAD, nor the WTO could do or
could do as well, given the nature, the constituency, and the orientation of each of these
bodies. 46 Moreover, a WTO antitrust regime never materialized. The very informality of
the ICN, with its lack of secretariat, antitrust-only agenda, noncontroversial initial agenda
45. The ICN has, for example, given advice to officials of the new antitrust regimes in China and India.
The American Bar Association Antitrust and International Law Sections and the International Bar Associa-
non have likewise given advice to China and India based in the ICN recommendations. India has explicitly
linked revisions to its draft merger rules to the ICN recommendations.
46. The ICN's unique networking approach, which harnesses immense energy of private stakeholders, is a
distinguishing feature. Also, there is a complementarity among the organizations. The ICN's active and
dynamic work has acted as a competitive spur to enliven the competition policy work of the OECD.
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(merger filing rules and modes of advocacy), and lack of power to make rules or enforce
them, has conduced to the fruitful interchange that characterizes the ICN.
Should the ICN's effectiveness be assessed also in terms of the extent to which its rec-
ommended practices have been adopted and implemented? Some argue that implementa-
tion is the measure of the ICN's success. 47 This author disagrees, but observes
nonetheless that there has been a substantial degree of implementation of the ICN's
merger process recommendations.
B. LEGITIMACY: IS THE ICN LEGITImATE?
The ICN is built around notions of participation and transparency. 48 All antitrust juris-
dictions of the world are invited to belong to the ICN. Representatives of all authorities
are invited to attend the annual meetings and workshops and to take part in all working
groups. A substantial number of non-governmental advisors (predominantly from the de-
fense bar and business but also some academics and others) actively participate, although
consumer groups and representatives of the private plaintiffs' bar are noticeably under-
represented. Attendance at the annual meetings is high. More than 500 delegates, repre-
senting more than seventy agencies, NGAs, observers, and guests, took part in the
Seventh Annual Conference in Kyoto in April 2008. The ICN prides itself on its open,
inviting, inclusive, and transparent process.
The degree of participation by other than a central core of mature antitrust jurisdictions
is predictably limited by lack of funds (despite some funding by the ICN), lack of time,
sometimes by lack of expertise, and sometimes by language. (The lingua franca of the
meetings is, most often, the language of the host plus English).4 9 The numerous round-
the-world telephone conferences are scheduled for times that will be not inconvenient for
most of the world, but this often means 8:00 a.m. eastern time, disadvantaging Australia,
New Zealand, and the Far East. Less well-resourced authorities have constraints against
aspiring to be chair of the steering group and even serving as a member of the steering
group. This means that authorities from resource-strained nations have less opportunity
to participate in setting the agenda and to write first drafts of recommendations. Individ-
uals not confident of their English language abilities or their level of technical knowledge
are reluctant to speak and often remain silent. These practical considerations may pro-
duce effective underrepresentation of developing countries, and (at least by default)
47. See Rowley & Wakil, supra note 34; ICN, Newsroom 2008, supra note 40; ICN, Newsroom 2008, supra
note 41.
48. See Eleanor M Fox, RFPORT ON THE FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE ICN II (Naples, Italy,
Sept. 2002) (summarizing the remarks of Wlliam Kovacic regarding efforts of the ICN fund-raising commit-
tee to attract sufficient funds to enable the attendance of representatives of the developing countries), available
at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference-lst-naples-2002/icn-napes-
report.pdf. Most systems, however, do not follow the United States procedure but limit challenges to notifi-
able mergers. For the importance, generally, of transparency, see William Kovacic, Remarks Before the Seoul
Competition Forum: Achieving Better Practices in the Design of Competition Policy Institutions (April 20,
2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/040420comppolicyinst.pdf. See also Slaughter, supra
note 1; Raustiala, supra note 2.
49. Sometimes an additional option, such as German, Italian, French, or Spanish, is available, but transla-
tion is expensive. The documents are almost all in English. The merger recommended practices are posted
also in French and Spanish.
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greater voice of the two antitrust leading models in the world-the United States and the
European Union.50
These observations would make less difference if the ICN had no power. But does the
ICN have power, in spite of its proclaimed nature? This is a question to which we shall
come.
C. SUFFICIENCY: IS THE ICN SUFFICIENT?
By definition, the ICN is not sufficient as antitrust global governance; it was never
meant to be. It is not sufficient to solve world competition problems that arise from the
internationalization of markets such as the disconnect between anti-dumping laws and
predatory pricing, jurisdictional gaps allowing export cartels, parochial uses of state mea-
sures that immunize private action, and the lack of a coherent view of world competition
and trade-and-competition problems.5 1 The ICN limits itself to facilitating dialogue,
mentoring, and nudging applications of national laws to be more alike.
By facilitating convergence of procedures and legal principles, the ICN could pave the
way towards a future international antitrust system.52 Perhaps more likely, the ICN and
the work of the sister institutions, think tanks, and international conferences and training
programs, will fill enough of the gap, softening rough edges, to alleviate a felt need for an
international law of antitrust. The work of the ICN may tend to confirm the perspective
that only an open, informal, and notionally non-consequential process can achieve as
much trust, respect, sharing, and consensus as the ICN has done and is likely to do.5 3
D. DOES THE ICN HAVE POWER?
What if the ICN has power by effect, if not purpose? What if the ICN is becoming the
international antitrust standard-setting (norm-setting) organization for the world? The
answer has bearing on all three of the factors examined: effectiveness, legitimacy, and (in
part) sufficiency.
50. See Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a
Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY Bus. LJ. 37, 106-07 (2007). Sokol notes that the concern is mitigated by
membership of several developing countries on the ICN steering committee. Indeed, in January 2009, David
Lewis of South Africa became the interim chair of ICN, succeeding Sheridan Scott of Canada upon her
stepping down as Competition Commissioner of Canada.
51. See Eleanor Fox & Janusz Ordover, Internationalizing Competition Law to Limit Parochial State and Pri-
vate Action: Moving Towards the Vision of World Welfare, 24 Int'L Bus. Law. 458 (1996); WTO 1997 Report,
supra note 10; Heimler, supra note 8.
52. The degree of divergence of the law of the various nations was cited as one reason why the world was
not ready for an antitrust regime in the INTO. See Douglas Melamed, Promoting Sound Antitrust Enforcement
in the Global Economy, in INTrERNATIONAL ANTITRUsT LAW & POLICY: 2000 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW
INSTITUTE ch. 1. (Barry Hawk ed., 2001).
53. These accomplishments, however, do not imply that the ICN meets the unfilled need for a coherent
trade-and-competition perspective. See Fox & Ordover, supra note 51; WTO 1997 Report, supra note 11.
See Chris Noonan, THE EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF LVNrERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW (2008) Noonan
suggests that "[tlhe work of the ICN could formally and informally feed into the WTO processes." Id. at
563.
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We have seen in other fields, such as banking, the migration of soft law standards set by
discrete and even secretive bodies into harder international standards. 54 We have noted
the use of soft antitrust law to influence legislators and jurists. And we have noted the
claim that if the ICN does not achieve convergence, it has failed. More particularly, the
ICN merger recommendations have influenced and continue to influence the drafting and
revision of merger laws of member nations, 55 and they informed an OECD recommenda-
tion on merger notifications. 56 It is therefore not fanciful to consider that the ICN's
output may develop into soft law with some influence.
On this hypothesis,we might wish to consider two points. First, in setting the agenda, is
more deference due to the ideas and preferences of the "outer group"? If more deference
is accorded, might more issues surface that are of particular interest to the less mature and
smaller nations and other jurisdictions that are less like the United States and Europe?
Second, might the ICN wish to balance the benefits of consensus against the benefits of
freedom to diverge? After debate has failed to convince all members that a proposed
standard or methodology is good for it, might the ICN, rather than pressing for consensus
and thus tending to discount outliers, give the nod to a diversity of perspectives? 57 To
consider this balance between convergence and recognition and appreciation of diversity, I
present below two examples, and then ask, how important to "global antitrust" is the
emergence of one rule for the world?
At the first annual conference in Naples 2002, the Mergers Working Group presented
recommended practices regarding merger notifications: what mergers must be notified to
reviewing authorities, when, and in what form. The proposed recommended practices
required (among many other things) a significant nexus between the merging parties and
the reviewing jurisdiction, so that transactions that were unlikely to have an appreciable
anticompetitive effect in a potential reviewing jurisdiction would be screened out of the
process. One of the recommended practices stated that the nexus (e.g., sales in the juris-
diction) should be measured by the local activities of at least two parties to the transaction
or by reference to the acquired firm's business in the local territory.
The director general of a competition authority of a small country argued that sales of
the acquiring business in the local territory should also, independently, satisfy the nexus
requirements, since a domestic acquiring company might harm competition in that nation
by acquiring a foreign potential entrant. He proposed amending the language of the rec-
ommendation so that nexus could be satisfied by the activity of the acquired company "or
the acquiring company." The amendment was opposed on grounds that the addition
would pick up too many non-problematic mergers, and that nations could, as does the
54. Roman Grynberg & Sacha Silva, Harmonization Without Representation: Small States, the Basel Commit-
tee, and the TO, 34 WORLD DEv. 1223 (2006) (noting that small states, excluded from the process, were put
at a competitive disadvantage by banking standards).
55. See Tritell, supra note 38; Rowley & Wakil, supra note 41.
56. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, OECD Doc. C(2005)34 (Mar. 23, 2005),
available at http://webdominol.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/c(2005)34.
57. See Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High Quality Growth: What Are They and How to Acquire Them?, STUD.
IN Co.,op. L'Nr'L DEV., Sept. 2000, at 3, 5 ("I emphasize the importance of'local knowledge' and argue that a
strategy of institution building must not overemphasize best-practice 'blueprints' at the expense of local ex-
periementation."). Yet, there are trade-offs between blueprints and experimentation; there is opportunity for
"institutional arbitrage"; much technical legislation can be borrowed wholesale or at least be a source for
learning. Id. at 13-14.
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United States, address the problem by allowing the authorities to challenge even non-
notifiable mergers. The proponent of the amendment was later accommodated.B
Smaller and transitional jurisdictions may have preferred the wider net for merger con-
trol (although they also may be relieved by a smaller pool of transactions to vet). The
ICN recommendation was advantageous the business communites, which worried about
the business costs of a wider net more than the public costs of mergers that might slip
through the holes in the net.59
The second example involves abuse of dominance. There was, as to be expected, some
diversity of point of view on how to analyze and apply abuse-of-dominance law. The first
important issue was how to prove "substantial market power"-which is a first step in the
proof of whether the economic power was abused. In proving substantial market power,
may significant or even controlling weight be appropriately given to the putative domi-
nant firm's large market share? May and should proof of a large market share satisfy the
plaintiff's prima facie case?
Most mature jurisdictions and their NGAs argued that proof of substantial market
power is a very complex matter; that market shares mean very little in themselves, and that
significant economic evidence is necessary to hurdle this first stage in an abuse of domi-
nance case. They expressed concern that a simplistic market share test for market power
would unjustly label too many firms "dominant," the label of dominance would focus a
spotlight of suspicion, and the effect would be to cause the firms to pull their punches and
thus to chill their pro-competitive, inventive behavior.
The South African representative, David Lewis, Chair of the South African Competi-
tion Tribunal, strongly disagreed with the rejection of the market share proxy. He espe-
cially disagreed with the proposed recommendation as applied to South Africa. He argued
that developing countries cannot bear a heavy burden of proof at this first stage of pro-
ceedings against an apparently dominant firm; that authorities should be able to use high
market share as a proxy for market power; and that a rule requiring complex economic
evidence and analysis to determine whether a firm with a high market share was indeed
dominant would tend to put beyond the ability of developing countries' competition au-
thorities the power to challenge the persistent monopolistic conduct that blights their
economies. 60
58. The ICN addressed the problem by adding to the recommendation. Notification thresholds may be
based on the acquiring firm's local activities but only if 1) the authority would otherwise be deprived of
jurisdiction over the merger, and 2) additional jurisdictional screens are added to minimize filing require-
ments for non-problematic acquisitions. See ICN Document Library, Document Type: Guidelines/Best and
Recommended Practices, http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/library/doc-type/
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
59. Of course, if business is paying unnecessary costs, this also harms their customers-the consumers.
Under either proposal, filing thresholds based on sales or assets in the jurisdiction are arbitrary. A larger
quantum of sales is no indication of anticompetitive effects. Market share in the jurisdiction would be better
correlated with anticompetitive effects, but market share as the benchmark was rejected as too subjective and
giving less certainty.
60. David Lewis, Chilling Competition, in IN-rERNATIONAL ANTrrRUST LAW & POLICY: 2008 FORDHAM
COMPETITON LAW INsTITtrrE (Barry Hawk ed., 2009). Under South African competition law, "[a] firm is
dominant in a market if- (a) it has at least 45 percent of that market .. " Competition Act of 19 89 s. 7. See
Michal S. Gal, Ertra-territorial Application of Antitrnist The Case of a Small Economy (Isreal), in, CooPERA-
TION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY (A. Guzman ed., forthmocimg Oxford 2009) (noting that ICN
rejection of the market share proxy may imply that small jurisdictions will not have the practical ability to
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A document emerged from the process and was adopted at the annual conference. It
states that proof of substantial market power is a complex inquiry; "[a] firm should not be
found to possess dominance/substantial market power without a comprehensive consider-
ation of factors affecting competitive conditions in the market under investigation."
6 1
"Market shares should be used" as a starting point for analysis. "However, since market
shares fail to reflect certain important features of the competitive environment, in particu-
lar market dynamics, they should be put into perspective by consideration of other factors,
such as potential entry .... ,,62 The recommendation identifies the various indicia that
should influence analysis.
South Africa lost the battle. The mature jurisdictions and their NGAs, however, lost
their claim that large market share is no sign at all of economic power and should never be
a basis for burden-shifting.
Dcvcloping countries and poorly-resourced authorities might have been better satisfied
by an ICN endorsement of the use of a high market share, or persistent high market share
in the context of a high-barrier market, as a proxy for substantial market power. They
might have been better satisfied by an ICN document stating that a high market share
accompanied by barriers to entry may give rise to a presumption of economic power,
which is in fact the law in many jurisdictions.6 3 The recommendation is more conserva-
tive than the law.
An unastounding observation can be drawn from these vignettes. The voices of the
major players in the developed world are likely to be more influential than the voices of
developing and small economies. Even so, the leaders of the ICN have shown consistent
resolve to include, involve, and respond to all voice.
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF ICN's POWER OR INFLUENCE: THE
IMPORTANCE OF CONVERGENCE VERSUS THE IMPORTANCE OF
RECOGNIZING DIVERSITY
How important to a linked world is commonality of rules, standards, and procedures?
How important is recognition of diversity?
To explore these questions, we might take three examples. The first example is one of
the ICN merger recommendations: the recommendation of flexibility in the required tim-
ing of filings so as to permit early merger notification-e.g., merger notification may be
made upon the parties' certification of a good faith intent to consummate the transaction.
This recommendation addressed the problem that jurisdictions specified different trigger-
ing dates, resulting in a situation in which the same merger could not be filed on the same
bring abuse of dominance cases; "in reality small jurisdictions are mostly, once again, rule takers rather than
rule makers.").
61. ICN, Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Dominance/Substantial Market Power Analysis Pursuant to
Unilateral Conduct Laws 2 (May 9, 2008), available at http://www.internacionalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/
library/unilateral_conduct/UnilateralWG_1l.pdf.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Caselaw in most jurisdictions, including the United States, provides that very high market shares (such
as in excess of 70 percent) shifts the burden to the putative dominant firm to show that it does not have
significant market power. See Market Share as an Indicator of Monopoly Power, in 2002 ANN-uAL REV1EW OF
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMFN ,'TS 53, 53-54 (5th ed. 2002). For Europe, see Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie
BV v. Commission, 1991 ECR 3151.
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day in the many regulating jurisdictions. Uniform implementation of the recommenda-
tion would simplify the filing process and save millions of dollars for the merging firms.
Also, it would enable agencies to coordinate reviews. Retaining divergences would serve
no purpose. Nothing was at stake for a nation faced (merely) with changing its permissi-
ble filing date to accord with the recommendation.
The second example is the nexus requirement, discussed above. Mature jurisdictions
and the business community preferred a rule limiting the set of mergers subject to notifi-
cation in a jurisdiction to those in which both merger partners or at least the acquired
partner had sufficient sales or assets in the jurisdiction. At least one small jurisdiction
expressed preference for a more copious rule that would have allowed the nexus require-
ment to be fulfilled by the significant presence of either merging partner. Adopting the
smaller net would go some distance in helping to solve the recognized problem of exces-
sive reach of merger filing laws. It would help grease the wheels of business efficiency in
the world. It would also relieve agencies of the burden of vetting large numbers of proba-
bly non-problematic mergers. Yet (at least arguendo for purposes of this example), for
some jurisdictions the larger net would enhance the quality of their antitrust enforcement,
catching acquisitions of potential entrants. Would the wider reach significantly disrupt
and unduly burden business? Experts may disagree. In any event, mere advocacy for con-
formity with an ICN recommendation such as this seems harmless.64 The principle requir-
ing an appreciable nexus is not fairly contestable. The recommendation brings home the
importance of the principle in a potentially unruly world. One may hope that all nations
will take cognizance of the principle. If some nations object to its restrictive application,
they may simply design their nexus rules as they see fit.
Third is the proof-of-dominance example from the unilateral conduct project. The
problem here is much more complex because it is about substantive principles of law,
claims of "sound economics," practicalities in enforcement, market contexts, and agency
capabilities. Economies differ from one another. Some economies have been historically
monopolized by state enterprise, others boast merit-grown businesses in robust markets
and no historic statism. Some agencies are well funded and staffed with teams of econo-
mists; others are resource starved. The different characteristics may call for different for-
mulations of law.65
This third example is the one example in which ICN outputs are susceptible to becom-
ing soft and maybe harder law for the world. Common substantive principles of law for
the world are good and useful for coherence, efficiency, and guidance, all other things
being equal, as the developing country experience constantly affirms. 66 But all other
things are not equal. Especially if ICN standards might become an influential source for
antitrust standards in the world, it seems to this writer that, in the third situation, recogni-
64. Such advocacy is especially harmless in view of the amendment to the proposed nexus recommendation.
See supra note 57.
65. See John Fingleton & Ali Nikpay, Stimudating or Chilling Competition, in NrTRNATIONAL ANri IERUST
LAs'W & POLICY: 2008 FORDIAM COMPFT[TION LA%'V lNsTrrUIE (Barry Hawk ed., 2009) (noting that econ-
omies with sluggish markets might need more aggressive antitrust).
66. See Commission on Growth & Development, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and
Inclusive Development (2008), available at http://www.growthcommission.org/index.phpoption=com-con-
tent&task=view&id=96&Itemid= 169.
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tion of diversity is more important than conformity. Thus, the ICN might usefully adopt
Slaughter's "norm of legitimate difference." 67
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the ICN has been dramatically successful. Its limits have also been its
success. It has carved out a space for itself that no other enterprise or project could have
achieved. Its own success may have overtaken calls for a global framework for antitrust
proper, suggesting that a future WTO project might limit itself to the trade-competition
issues left unaddressed. 68 The agenda of "all antitrust all the time" has paid off.69
The exuberance comes with two big caveats, based on inconsistent scenarios. First, the
ICN's roots are only virtual roots. Virtual roots are easily pulled up. If the leaders and
netwvorkers stop pedaling the ICN bicycic, the bicycle will fall. This amazing virtual or-
ganization is fully in place, and its movers are unusually hard working and productive (and
open and inviting). But ICN depends on continuous devoted leadership and engaging and
useful projects. While there is almost no end to global competition problems, the ICN
has picked much of the low-hanging fruit. The problems yet to be tackled are more con-
troversial and harder to solve.
To address these problems, a productive future might encompass three aspects: First,
the agenda. Some projects might be chosen even when the problems appear intractable.
For example, future projects might include nationalistic aspects of financial rescues; cumu-
lative regulation (where laws of many nations are applied to the same cross-border con-
duct) that becomes over-regulation; jurisdictional clashes; and needs of developing
countries in addition to technical assistance and capacity building. Discussing these
problems with new sympathy and in new light might lead to an architecture for building
bridges over persistent gaps.
Second, testing effectiveness. The ICN might take inventory to examine its apparent
successes and shortcomings.70 What do the representatives at the ICN annual confer-
ences do when they return home? Do they brief their fellow officials and staff?. Do they
examine their nation's state of compliance with ICN recommended practices, and con-
sider how to comply (or why not to comply)? Do they do nothing? How well do the
working groups function, and how useful is their output? How useful are the workshops
for learning techniques and ideas that can be implemented at home? What can be learned
from networks in other disciplines, such as are examined in this symposium issue? 71
67. See Slaughter, supra note 1, at 247-50, 259. The norm of legitimate difference mandates "respect... to
national officials unless a specific reason exists to suspect that they will chauvinistically privilege their own
citizens." Id. at 248. "It enshrines pluralism as a basis for, rather than a bar to, regulatory cooperation ......
Id. at 249.
68. These include the flanking issues of dumping/predatory pricing, market access, export cartels, and state
shields that protect private anticompetitive conduct.
69. The circumscribed mandate need not deter the ICN from addressing global questions that are "all
antitrnst'-such as a world clearing house for filings of international mergers, methodologies and priorities to
modulate systems clashes, and the role of the financial crisis in the application and enforcement of antitrust
laws.
70. See generally Kovacic, Achieving Better Practices, sitpra note 48, for a wise presentation of the virtues of
self-examination.
71. Other networks, however, are more ambitious and by their very ambition they confront challenges that
the ICN avoids. By working towards rules and world governance, other networks may confront two types of
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Third: movers and leaders. Inspired and hard-working movers and leaders are critical.
The ICN has been blessed with such leaders from scores of countries for all of its nine
years. The inspirational flame must keep burning. It is most likely to keep burning in a
world in which the ICN matters.
While the first caveat was that the ICN could fall apart, the second caveat is: the ICN
might have power. The ICN is a vehicle for soft-law formation, and soft law has a ten-
dency to become hard law. For that reason, more acknowledgment might be made of the
needs and context of developing countries, small economies, and indeed all jurisdictions
other than the United States and the EU. This can be done seamlessly within existing
frameworks. Work product, even in the form of recommended practices, can acknowl-
edge differences among nations in analytical methodologies and in preferred rules-dif-
ferences that may stem from stages of development, unequal agency capacities, and
weakness of competition in local markets. Moreover, the power scenario means that the
ICN must pay continued attention to transparency, process, and participation and indeed
might consider a greater voice for consumer groups, plaintiffs' lawyers, and other under-
represented stakeholders.
The ICN has far surpassed expectations. It fills a real need in global antitrust. As Joel
Klein said in the months before the birth of the ICN, if it did not exist, it would have to be
invented. It is a model worth exploring by other disciplines in the cohort of national
economic law that applies to conduct in global markets and yet resists internationalization.
problems, as identified by Pierre-Hugues Verdier, supra note 2 at 115. First, domestic political pressures may
be brought to bear to constrain regulators' autonomy to pursue wise global policy. Second, tighter coopera-
tion is likely to raise significant conflicts over distributive consequences, for the costs and benefits of proposed
standards may fall differently on different states. In view of these problems, Verdier questions Slaughter's
claim that networks offer an alternative to regulatory races to the top or bottom. Id. at 143. By rejecting the
pursuit of binding rules, the ICN by-passes these problems.
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